Monetary policy and asset prices: what role for central banks in new EU member states? by Frait, Jan & Komárek, Luboš
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Abstract 
The paper deals with the relationship between monetary policy and asset prices. Besides 
surveying the general discussion, it attempts to extend it to recent developments in the new 
Member States of the EU (NMS), namely the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia 
(the EU4). After a brief description of the current macroeconomic situation in the NMS, the 
appropriate reaction of monetary policy to asset price bubbles is dealt with and the main pros and 
cons associated with this reaction are summarised. Afterwards, the risks of asset market bubbles 
in the EU4 countries are evaluated. Since the capital markets are still underdeveloped and the real 
estate price boom seems to be a natural reaction to the initial undervaluation, the risks are viewed 
as rather small. The conclusion is thus that it is crucial for central banks in mature economies as 
well as in the NMS to conduct their monetary policies as well as their supervisory and regulatory 
roles in a way that does not promote the build-up of asset market bubbles. In exceptional times, 
central banks of small open economies must be ready to use monetary policy steps as a kind of 
insurance against the adverse effects of potential asset market bubbles. 
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1. Introduction: Current Developments in the New EU Member States 
The new Member States of the European Union (NMS) went through a successful stabilisation 
process. With inflation and pressures for nominal appreciation of domestic currencies low (see 
appendix), their central banks lowered short-term interest rates to historically low levels. Figure 1 
shows the development of the monetary policy interest rates of the selected NMS, namely the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia (EU4). There is a significant downward trend in 
all the rates, with the exception of the Polish rate during 2000 and the Hungarian policy swings 
during 2003. During the period under review, the lowest rates were always seen in the Czech 
Republic, which is the only economy with experience of a negative interest rate differential 
against ECB rates.1  
Figure 1: Monetary Policy Interest Rates in the EU4 (%) 
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Note: CR=Czech Republic, H=Hungary, P=Poland, SK=Slovakia. 
Source: Eurostat, EU4 central bank web pages. 
Figure 2 presents the development of the average lending rates of the EU4 countries, which also 
slope down during the last decade, especially in Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. Czech lending 
rates had already moved to very low levels by 1999. Long-term nominal interest rates also went 
down sharply, thanks in part to expectations of euro adoption. In addition, restructured and 
privatised banks recently began to extend credit to the corporate sector and households again.  
 
                                          
1 The Czech National Bank set its monetary policy rate (the 2-week repo rate) below the European (ECB) level in 
three periods: 26 July 2002 – 6 December 2002, 31 January 2003 – 7 March 2003, and 29 April 2005 – 27 October 
2005. The negative interest rate differential was always 0.25 p.p., except for the period 1 November 2002 – 6 
December 2002 (0.5 p.p.). 
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Figure 2: Average Lending Rates in the EU4 (% p.a.) 
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Note: CR=Czech Republic, H=Hungary, P=Poland, SL=Slovakia. The shaded area identifies membership of the 
EU. 
Source: IMF-IFS CD-ROM.  
The combined effect can be seen mainly in a rapid credit expansion in the housing loans segment 
in the household sector, with yearly increases of between 30% and 50% in most countries – see 
figure 3. There are fears that the mix of credit boom and optimistic expectations may support 
investment of a speculative kind and create asset bubbles similar to those experienced by many 
developed economies in the past. And in the same way, the formation of these bubbles may not 
be accompanied by visible pressures for consumer price inflation, which is the main focus of 
central banks. And at the same time, the NMS have become part of the worldwide discussion on 
the impact of the low interest rate environment, high liquidity and easy availability of credit on 
asset markets and on the role of monetary policy in supporting and subsequently taming asset 
price inflation.  
The NMS central banks thus now face the same questions as their counterparts in many 
developed countries: Are current monetary policies supporting the build-up of asset market 
bubbles? Should central banks incorporate asset prices into their policy decision-making 
processes and react to asset price inflation with interest rate changes? These particular questions 
have been the subject of a lively discussion in recent years among central bankers and academics 
in the US and many other countries. Our intention is to help to extend the discussion to the local 
scene, even though this may seem premature to at least some observers. For these reasons, we 
will focus mainly on the aforementioned EU4 economies. 
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Figure 3: Household Credit Growth (y-o-y, %) 
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Note: CR=Czech Republic, H=Hungary, P=Poland, SL=Slovakia.  
Source: Eurostat, IMF-IFS CD-ROM and authors’ calculations. 
2. How Should Monetary Policy Respond to Asset Prices?  
2.1 Importance of Asset Prices for Central Banks  
Whether monetary policy should actively seek to encourage asset price2 stability, or even whether 
it should seek to prevent or at least reduce asset price bubbles, really is one of the key current 
topics of debate among central bankers. Despite what the media sometimes says, hardly any 
central banker argues that central banks should completely ignore asset prices and focus only on 
consumer prices defined in terms of consumer price index (CPI) changes. As stressed by Bollard 
(2004), for example, economists agree that central banks should take asset prices into account, 
but they disagree on whether they should respond to asset price drifts. 
Central banks automatically take asset price developments into account when setting monetary 
policy, even if formally they focus on price stability defined solely in terms of prices of 
consumption. This is primarily because asset price movements impact on CPI inflation and large 
movements in asset prices can have significant implications for CPI inflation. If prices of real 
estate, for example, are rising faster than inflation, people try to build more houses. To do so, 
they demand more building materials, putting pressure on the prices of those materials. In 
                                          
2 By asset price we mean the price of something bought to generate income or to sell later on for a profit. Examples 
are physical assets such as real estate or collectables, and financial assets such as shares, bonds, foreign exchange 
and other financial instruments. 
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addition to that direct impact, asset price movements also feed into CPI inflation through the 
“wealth effect”. As asset prices rise, people tend to feel wealthier. This can apply to any kind of 
asset, but in many countries we see this mostly through house prices, due to the high proportion 
of household wealth associated with housing. The Czech Republic ranks among the countries 
where housing has a major share in household wealth, and at the same time, the share of net 
financial assets is relatively low and does not have a clear growth tendency. In countries with 
developed and broad stock markets, the wealth effect applies also to share prices.  
Asset prices also feed through into spending and hence inflation in other ways. For example, 
asset price increases improve balance sheets, increasing the borrowing capacity of firms and 
individuals. Increases in net worth tend to increase the willingness of lenders to lend and 
borrowers to borrow, facilitating a general expansion in spending as well as an expansion in 
spending on investment in appreciating assets. Most of the time, asset and consumer prices 
roughly move together and asset prices present no major problem for monetary policy. There are, 
however, times when asset prices move well out of line with underlying economic fundamentals. 
Sometimes, asset prices can become disconnected from reasonable expectations of future 
earnings, resulting in speculative bubbles that cannot be justified by economic fundamentals. 
Sooner or later, speculative bubbles will burst. But the damage they can do to the economy can 
be huge. This brings us to the question of whether central banks should try to constrain asset 
price bubbles.  
2.2 Three Main Opinions on Asset Price Bubbles 
Economists have a variety of opinions on this question. We prefer to divide them into three 
groups. The first one comprises those who say that a central bank should pay attention to asset 
market developments, but cannot and should not try to constrain asset price bubbles on their own. 
Ben Bernanke a former Fed governor and a future Fed chairman, seems to serve as the speaker 
for this group. We will use his words to define the other two groups and explain his views on the 
issue. We will then question his views and explain why a more active approach may sometimes 
be justified.  
Bernanke (1999, 2001 or 2002) suggests a very simple rule for central bank policy regarding 
asset market instability: Use the right tool for the job. Bernanke (2002) says that the Fed has two 
sets of responsibilities – maximum sustainable employment, stable prices and moderate long-
term interest rates on the one hand, and the stability of the financial system on the other. To 
achieve that, the Fed has two sets of policy tools: policy interest rates and a range of powers with 
respect to financial institutions. By using the right tool for the job, he means that the Fed will do 
its best by focusing its monetary policy instruments on achieving its macro goals, while using its 
regulatory, supervisory and lender-of-last resort powers to help ensure financial stability.  
Bernanke agrees that a central bank must monitor financial markets intensively and continuously. 
To the extent that a stock market boom causes higher spending on consumer goods and 
investments, it may indicate future inflationary pressures. A policy tightening might therefore be 
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an appropriate reaction. But the goal of the reaction should be to contain the incipient inflation, 
not the stock market boom. A central bank cannot be an arbiter of security valuation. In other 
words, it should use monetary policy to target the economy, not the asset markets. He believes 
that a far better approach is to use micro-level policies to reduce the incidence of bubbles and to 
protect the financial system against their effects.  
To protect the financial system, the central bank should use its regulatory and supervisory powers 
instead. In particular, it should ensure, together with other financial sector regulators, that 
financial institutions and markets are well prepared for a large shock to asset prices. To achieve 
that, commercial banks must be well capitalised and well diversified and they should stress-test 
their portfolios against a wide range of scenarios. The central bank can also contribute to 
reducing the probability of boom-and-bust cycles by supporting more transparent accounting and 
disclosure practices and working to improve the financial literacy and competence of investors. 
And if a sudden correction in asset prices does occur, the central bank’s first responsibility is to 
do its part to ensure the integrity of the financial infrastructure – in particular, the payment 
system and systems for settling trades in securities and other financial instruments. If necessary, 
the central bank should provide ample liquidity until the immediate crisis has passed.  
Bernanke (2002) “sends” the advocates of a more active monetary policy response to asset prices 
into two broad camps, differing primarily in how aggressive they think the central bank should be 
in attacking bubbles. The first group favours a “lean-against-the-bubble” strategy. Its 
representatives agree that a central bank should take account of, and respond to, the implications 
of asset-price changes for its macro-goal variables. But also, according to this view, a central 
bank should try to gently steer asset prices away from the presumed bubble path. The theoretical 
arguments that have been made for the lean-against-the-bubble strategy are not entirely without 
merit. It seems that it may be worthwhile for a central bank to take out a little “insurance” against 
the formation of an asset-price bubble and its potentially adverse effects. Bernanke nevertheless 
believes that leaning against the bubble is unlikely to be productive in practice.  
The second group comprises those preferring a more activist approach. Bernanke labels it 
“aggressive bubble-popping”. Aggressive bubble-poppers would like to see a central bank raise 
interest rates proactively to eliminate potential bubbles. Bernanke views this particular approach 
as risky and dangerous. He supports this opinion by pointing to Federal Reserve policy in the 
1920s. When interest rates peaked in August 1929, the economy was already slowing, though 
stock prices were still rather high. The Fed tried to prick the stock market bubble, but succeeded 
only in killing the economy. It seems to us that something similar may also have happened in 
Japan during the 1990s. The result was the lost decade of the Japanese economy.  
We agree that generally there are clear-cut arguments against an activist approach. First, a central 
bank cannot reliably identify bubbles in asset prices. This seems to be a crucial argument. What 
we do know is that the monetary policy response to an asset price increase should depend on the 
source of the increase. And we agree that central banks should not react to asset prices unless 
they indicate changes in expected inflation. Unfortunately, it is rather difficult to know at any 
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particular point in time whether the increase reflects fundamental improvements or excessively 
optimistic expectations. It is thus also difficult to know whether the asset price changes indicate 
improved productivity or higher expected prices. But on some occasions we can be quite sure that 
a bubble is on the way, because we simply cannot find any fundamentals behind the asset price 
drift.  
Second, even if a central bank can identify bubbles, monetary policy does not possess appropriate 
tools for effective use against them. A small increase in the policy interest rate can only lead to a 
correspondingly modest decline in the likelihood or size of a bubble. It is unlikely that a small 
increase in short-term interest rates, unaccompanied by a significant slowdown of the economy, 
will induce speculators to modify their equity or real estate investment plans. Interest rates simply 
have limited power to affect the perceptions that move asset prices in the first place. To 
materially affect some asset prices, such as housing, interest rates would probably need to move 
by much more than would be required just to keep CPI inflation comfortably within the target 
range. Since interest rate changes affect not just house prices, but also the prices of most other 
assets, goods and services, there would be secondary, unintended consequences, with potentially 
serious consequences for the economy as a whole. 
The third problem is the timing of the central bank’s reaction. Once a central bank becomes sure 
that a bubble has emerged, it will probably be too late to act with interest rate hikes. These may 
instead conflict with other economic forces that have begun to act. Given the lag that we think 
applies between an interest rate move and its effect on the real economy, the risk is high that the 
policy moves would be wrongly timed and only make matters worse. If interest rates are high at 
the moment a bubble bursts, those high interest rates will still be affecting the economy two years 
on. This would make the landing harder. 
Fourth, pursuing a separate asset price objective could mean having to compromise on the normal 
inflation objective. Seeking to stabilise rising house prices or an overheated stock market might 
mean having to force inflation lower than would otherwise be required. It might also mean 
greater variability in the real economy, interest rates and, potentially, the exchange rate. 
Does all this mean that Bernanke is right? We would say that in many ways yes. But we would 
also say that Bernanke ignores some important aspects. First, he seems to ignore the question of 
what to do if the bubble is emerging without any signs of inflationary pressures? Inflation 
measured in terms of consumer prices has not always signalled when imbalances in the economy 
have been building up. A strong expansion in credit and increasing asset prices have preceded 
almost all banking crises and the majority of deep recessions in countries around the world over 
the past one hundred years. In many cases inflation has at the same time been low and stable 
before the crisis.  
A central bank reaction to growth in asset prices is believed to be appropriate only when signals 
exist that the economy may become overheated. However, the prevailing monetary policy models 
used to forecast inflation pressures often derive demand pressures (approximated by the output 
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gap) from current inflation pressures. Given that, some signals that inflation pressures may 
increase in the more distant future may be ignored, especially if monetary policy horizons are too 
short.  
Here we can provide a realistic scenario for a small open economy. It may arise when higher 
economic growth creates excessively optimistic expectations that lead to nominal appreciation of 
the domestic currency. In such a situation, very low inflation can prevail even under rapid credit 
growth and asset price acceleration for rather a long time. When the open inflation pressures 
finally appear, it may be too late for monetary policy to react. Forecasts of resource utilisation 
and inflation can also be systematically inaccurate because the models and assessments used do 
not take account of the independent role that asset prices and debt can play. Also, as a result of 
structural changes, historical relationships may have changed, thus causing the central bank, for 
example, to come to incorrect conclusions about the output gap and potential growth. 
Nevertheless, central banks in increasing numbers compile financial stability analyses that should 
reveal these particular risks.  
If these analyses identify the risk of a bubble emerging, responding is rather challenging. 
Nonetheless, the risks of the landing from the build-up and bursting of large asset price bubbles 
warrants taking some risks in an attempt to moderate the problem. There are cases where the 
asset price misalignment is sufficiently obvious that one can be confident enough to take the risk. 
Such situations are likely to be rare. And the risks may be considerable. In such a situation, 
tightening monetary policy may even lead consumer price inflation outside the target range. The 
central bank may be then blamed for squeezing growth from the economy. Nevertheless, by 
raising interest rates at an early stage when asset prices are starting to accelerate and before the 
expansion in credit has become too sharp, the central bank can indeed achieve somewhat lower 
inflation than is desirable in the short term, but may avoid a subsequent collapse in asset prices 
that could lead to considerably lower output and inflation in the longer term. And the somewhat 
tighter monetary policy than otherwise would be able to counter the over-optimistic pricing of 
financial assets and properties.  
2.3 Prudential Measures and Regulatory Features as a Solution?  
Bernanke also seems to forget that micro-policies are also difficult to apply in reality. He is not 
the only one. The new issue of the IMF World Economic Outlook (September 2005, p. 133) 
argues that “in cases where house price inflation remains robust, a combination of moral suasion 
and if necessary prudential measures could help limit potential risks; over the long term, 
regulatory features – including those that potentially constrain supply – that may exacerbate 
price pressures need also to be addressed”.  
                                          
3 The recommendations seem to build on the recent IMF Working Paper by Hilbers et al. (2005).  
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Hilbers et al. (2005) provide an extensive list of such measures and features. Among the 
prudential measures, higher and differentiated capital requirements, tighter loan classification and 
provisioning rules, dynamic provisioning (accounting for the phase of business cycle in 
calculating loan-loss provisions), stricter assessment of collateral, or tighter eligibility criteria for 
certain loans are suggested. Supervisory measures include increasing disclosure requirements, 
closer inspection and periodic stress testing. Some countries have also applied administrative 
measures such as bank-by-bank credit limits or mandatory credit rationing. These measures are 
not generally viewed as the “first best option” for taming excessive credit dynamics. This applies 
especially to the “prudential measures”, which should only be used when normal prudential 
measures (limits) do not work well and when the new ones can move the system towards the 
“best practice”4. All this sounds very well, but the reality is quite frustrating. It is rather difficult 
to find examples of “prudential measures” or “regulatory features” in use in developed countries. 
The typical user is a developing or transitional country in major problems, although attempts to 
apply them sometimes appear in mature economies too.  
Can any measures of this kind be recommended to the Czech Republic or other NMS if a housing 
bubble emerges in the future and, at the same time, no problems with price stability exist? 
Probably not, and not only because the framework has already been strengthened and there is 
hardly any room for further tightening. Besides that, the banking sector is preparing for the 
adoption of the Basel 2 rules. These, together with international accounting rules, make the 
application of nonstandard measures not so easy.  
The possibility of using prudential measures (in terms of anticyclical action) with the intention to 
address asset price bubbles was convincingly questioned by Bollard (2004). He finds 
administrative instruments to be blunt, harming newcomers to the market, distorting resource 
allocation and potentially depriving the private sector of sound investment opportunities. 
Prudential measures are unlikely to be very effective in addressing asset price cycles, either. The 
implementation of policy changes would take time, after which there would be potentially long 
and variable lags in the impact on asset prices. The use of such tools for macroeconomic purposes 
conflicts with the objective for which such tools were originally designed – i.e. financial stability. 
Indeed, the use of prudential regulation to moderate asset price cycles might backfire in some 
circumstances, creating perverse incentives for banks to bias their lending towards riskier ends of 
the lending spectrum, which in turn could reduce the stability of the financial system.  
                                          
4 This sort of measure was used in the Czech Republic at the end of 1990s. The supervisory authority required banks 
to build up provisions to cover loss loans collateralised by real estate to 100% of their value over three years. The 
reason behind the measure was the evidence that during the 1990s banks were lending against rather overvalued real 
estate.  
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3. Asset Markets and Risk of Bubbles in the NMS 
The restructuring and strengthening of financial sectors in the NMS has significantly increased 
access to external financing. This is facilitating the development of investment in various asset 
markets (the stock market, housing markets, the bond market). Despite remarkable progress, 
some of these markets are generally still thin and underdeveloped relative to mature economies. 
Nevertheless, this does not mean that the risks are relatively small. It may rather imply that it is 
more difficult to analyse these markets and detect potential imbalances. The difficulties are 
enhanced by incomplete data on the development of the asset markets in the NMS.  
From the point of view of international investors, the foreign exchange and stock markets are the 
most interesting in the countries we are focusing on. Domestic investors usually predominate in 
real estate markets, with the exception of some major cities. Naturally, fast growth of domestic 
credit should have the potential to initiate bubbles in these particular markets. Unfortunately, the 
lack of reliable data on these markets in the NMS prevents us from providing comparisons and 
deriving conclusions. Besides looking at the EU4 economies, we will comment separately on the 
Czech asset market events. This is a natural reflection of specific knowledge and lower 
uncertainty regarding the data.  
Despite rapid growth in lending to the private sector, the prudential indicators do not indicate a 
sizable increase in financial vulnerabilities in the banking systems of the EU4 countries and the 
NMS in general. Banks are well capitalised, they make hefty profits and the share of 
nonperforming loans in their portfolios is declining. However, these are normally lagging 
indicators of banking problems. We must therefore pay attention to the potential risks of the rapid 
credit expansion. The implications of the rapid growth in lending to the private sector are very 
often discussed with the other EU4 central banks. We usually agree that the risks are relatively 
low or even nonexistent. The reason is quite simple – the low base phenomenon.  
3.1 Foreign Exchange Markets 
There is one asset price that is subject to direct reaction of the monetary policy of many central 
banks – the exchange rate. This reaction is given by the direct impact of the exchange rate on 
inflation. There might be disputes about whether or not foreign exchange is an asset, as well as 
whether or not monetary policy interest rates should react to exchange rate swings. In practice, 
however, the exchange rate is such an important variable that central banks, especially in small 
open economies, can hardly ignore it. Many central banks which apply a floating regime 
therefore adjust their interest rates or intervene when facing significant exchange rate changes.  
The currencies of the EU4 countries became popular assets with international investors soon after 
the initial period of transition. The exchange rates of these currencies have been rather volatile at 
times, and some of the swings can be viewed as bubbles. Figure 4 shows the year-over-year 
changes in the EU4 currencies, demonstrating a relatively high correlation of appreciation and 
depreciation waves. 
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Figure 4: Dynamics of Nominal Exchange Rates of the EU4 against EUR (y-o-y, %) 
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Note: CZK=Czech koruna, HUF=Hungarian forint, PLN=Polish zloty, SKK=Slovak koruna; (+) appreciation, (-) 
depreciation. The shaded area identifies membership of the EU. 
Source: Eurostat, IMF-IFS CD-ROM and authors’ calculations. 
In the Czech Republic, a bubble-like situation was observed in 2002, when the CNB viewed the 
sharp appreciation of the koruna as unjustified by the fundamentals, labelled it a bubble and 
responded by interventions as well as interest rate cuts. The CNB explained its stance by the 
supposition that the appreciation was being caused by ill-perceived expectations of massive 
capital inflows due to privatisation sales. The CNB thus tried to spread the correct information 
among market participants and, besides providing verbal information, had to ensure that the 
information content was credible. The fact is that the koruna eventually started to depreciate and 
is still rather weaker compared to its peak in July 2002 (the left-hand side of figures in the 
appendix). The right-hand side of this figure then shows what we can expect from a floating 
exchange rate regime: y-o-y appreciations by 10–15%, followed by similar depreciation. PLN 
seems to be even more volatile than CZK: 20% up in 2001, then 15% down in 2003 and 20% up 
again in 2005. HUF also behaves like this, although the focus of the authorities on the exchange 
rate limits the fluctuations.  
3.2 Stock Markets  
Probably the first asset market bubble registered during the recent history of the Czech economy 
followed the voucher privatisation process in 1993–1995. During this period, more than 60% of 
the population obtained shares in hundreds of firms and privatisation funds. Despite the initial 
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optimistic expectations, the bubble soon burst, since most of the shares lost value rapidly. The 
bust is captured, albeit only partially, by the decline in the official CNB-120 and PX-50 stock 
market indices5 – see figure 5.  
Figure 5: Stock Market Indices in the Czech Republic (points) 
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Note: CNB_120 = The Czech National Bank monitored trends in the share price movements of 120 issues 
traded on the Prague Stock Exchange. The component companies were chosen to reflect the economy as a 
whole and thus all industries (1 March 1995 = 1,000 points); The PX50 consists of the most attractive domestic 
stocks traded on the Prague Stock Exchange in terms of turnover and market capitalisation (5 April 1994 = 
1,000 points). 
Source: www.cnb.cz 
The allocation of shares among the population certainly had a kind of wealth effect, although it 
was probably not that strong. Hanousek and Tůma (2002) conclude that consumers behaved 
according to the permanent income hypothesis and demonstrate that only a minor part of the 
newly created assets actually led to an immediate increase in household consumption. The strong 
growth in domestic demand in the period was thus driven primarily by the corporate credit boom 
brought about by the loose financial constraint of the new banking sector. It was no surprise that 
the stock price bust was followed by a real economy bust later on (Frait, 2000). Monetary policy 
could not react much, because its objective at that time was to keep the exchange rate fixed.  
How about the current stock markets in the EU4 countries? Recent sharp increases in stock 
exchange indices have already opened a debate on potential overvaluation due to purchases by 
foreign investors searching for higher yields. Figure 6 displays an almost ten-year history of stock 
                                          
5 There were two waves of voucher privatisation. The shares from the first one started to be listed in June and July 
1993 (622 plus 333 titles) and those from the second one in March 1995 (674 titles). The CNB-120 index was 
published from the end of 1993 until 31 December 1999. Publishing of the PX-50 began in April 1994 and over time 
has changed in composition completely. The index is thus rather an imprecise description of the voucher shares’ 
performance. Many shares in individual firms and privatisation funds that were not included in the index lost value 
completely and were removed from trading.  
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exchange indices in the EU4 economies. The movements between the Czech, Hungarian and 
Polish capital markets have been particularly similar. Especially from the second half of 2003 
onwards, we observe clear strong growth in all the indices 
Figure 6: Stock Market Indices in the EU4 (1995Q1=100) 
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Note: CR=Czech Republic (PX50), H=Hungary (BUX, rhs), P=Poland, SK=Slovak Republic. The shaded area 
identifies membership of the EU. 
Source: Eurostat and authors’ calculations. 
It is not our ambition to add to this particular debate. Instead, we have tried to find out to what 
extent the cycles in the EU4 stock exchanges have been associated with the corresponding 
business cycles. With this in mind, we calculate output gaps and stock exchange gaps by 
detrending the original series using the Band-Pass filter.6 The final outcomes are presented in 
figure 7, which also confirms that the development of the Czech, Hungarian and Polish capital 
markets is in accordance with the development of real GDP. Such a relationship did not apply for 
any significant period in the Slovak case.  
                                          
6 See, for example, Christiano and Fitzgerald (2003). 
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Figure 7: Output and Stock Exchange Gaps in the EU4 (%)  
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Note: stock exchange gap on rhs; CR=Czech Republic, H=Hungary, P=Poland, SL=Slovakia. The shaded area 
identifies membership of the EU. 
Source: Eurostat, IMF-IFS CD-ROM and authors’ calculations. 
The results suggest that stock prices generally reflect economic activity. Positive output gaps 
would in this case indicate future inflation pressures; the associated positive gap in stock prices 
would then provide no new piece of information. The reality is rather different. Standard 
monetary policy models base their estimations of the actual output gap more on the current state 
of inflation pressures than on the data on economic activity. Monetary policy models in many 
countries therefore do not incorporate stock market data. The eventual inclusion of the stock 
market depends on the country and the structure of the model used. However, the features of the 
stock markets in the EU4 countries (such as limited issuance of quoted equity and a low level of 
market capitalisation) mean that their information content is of rather limited importance. Figure 
8 confirms that the highest market capitalisation is in the Czech Republic (since the second half 
of 2002) and that in all the EU4 countries the levels are increasing (strongly in the Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Poland, and slowly in Slovakia). 
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Figure 8: Market Capitalisation in the EU4 (% of GDP) 
10
20
30
40
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
CR
H
P
SK
 
 
Note: CR=Czech Republic, H=Hungary, P=Poland, SL=Slovakia. The shaded area identifies membership of the 
EU. 
Source: Eurostat and authors’ calculations. 
3.3 Housing Market 
The growth rates of the mortgage markets in the NMS in recent years seem tremendous. 
However, the share of mortgages in GDP is still negligible compared to countries such as the 
Netherlands or the United Kingdom. This is captured well by figure 9, which plots growth in 
mortgage lending between 1998 and 2004 against the stock of mortgages as a percentage of GDP. 
All the EU4 countries are where they should be as catching-up economies.  
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Figure 9: Housing Market  
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Source: ECB, internal calculations. 
Housing loans are also the fastest growing component of credit in the EU4 countries. How much 
should central banks be concerned with a potential house price bubble? It is difficult to say 
generally because we do not have comparable data series at our disposal. As far as the Czech 
Republic is concerned, the available data presented in figure 10 can hardly be interpreted as a risk 
of a bubble. Despite remarkable dynamics in land prices, real estate prices seem to have been flat 
in the last two years. The price increases to date must be viewed mostly as movements towards 
more realistic values.  
Figure 10: Real Estate and Land Prices in the Czech Republic and Prague (1999Q1=100)  
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Note: CR=Czech Republic. The shaded area identifies membership of the EU. 
Source: Czech Statistical Office and internal calculation of the Czech National Bank. 
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3.4 Global Liquidity, Housing Loans and Real Estate Prices 
In the last few years, low nominal and real interest rates plus high global liquidity have been 
reflected in many countries by relatively high growth in credit and money supply. At the same 
time, many countries have experienced a real estate price boom. There is an interesting 
discussion among economists about whether money supply dynamics are causing real estate 
prices to rise or whether increased money creation is only a natural consequence of increased 
money demand due to the wealth effect of real estate price developments. This particular 
discussion is important for assessing the inflationary potential of the current money supply 
dynamics. If it is a consequence of the above-defined wealth effect, the inflation risk may be low, 
since once the real estate price growth slows down, demand for money will slow down too. 
Money supply growth rates would then tend to fall to much lower figures.  
Of course, money supply growth may be adding to the real estate price expansion. In many 
countries, the credit growth is apparently associated with the extension of housing loans. We can 
see numerous countries with real estate price growth of more than 10% annually in recent years 
(France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom, South Africa, New Zealand, the USA 
and Australia). According to the Economist (which compiles representative indices of real estate 
prices), relative to income, real estate prices peaked historically in 2004 in the USA, Australia, 
the United Kingdom, France, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand and Spain7. In some 
countries, structural changes in financial markets seem to be behind this. In some countries of the 
euro area, a fall in nominal interest rates to the German level acted as a booster. We plot credit 
growth and real estate prices in figure 11. We can see a relatively strong correlation, but we 
cannot assign a causal relation to it.  
                                          
7 Currently we are seeing flat or even declining real estate prices in some of these countries.  
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Figure 11: Correlation Between Credit Growth and Real Estate Prices in Developed Countries  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: DOMESTIC_CREDIT=65.96+0.088*HOUSE_PRICES 
Source: authors’ calculations based on IMF IFS and Economist indices (Economic Intelligence Unit database). 
Real estate market trends should be of concern to central banks in countries where real estate 
prices have a strong impact on consumer spending. This applies primarily to economies where 
mortgages with floating interest rates prevail and with widespread “mortgage equity withdrawal” 
(borrowing that is secured by housing stock but not invested in it)8. And these are the same 
countries that are prone to real estate market bubbles associated with periods of low real interest 
rates and strong credit expansion.  
A dominant view among central bankers is one that does not associate actual growth in real assets 
with inflation, because it does not influence the value of money expressed in goods and services. 
The reason is simple – future inflation should already be embodied in real asset prices. These can 
be expressed as the discounted value of future incomes from holding the assets. The discount 
factor for real asset valuation can be approximated by the real interest rate. If central banks base 
their decisions on estimated future inflation, they in some way stabilise the real interest rate. 
Prices of real assets then do not constitute a new piece of information. The application of this 
particular logic to real estate prices is nevertheless questionable. A number of activities linked to 
real estate influence the value of money in terms of goods and services. Changes in real estate 
prices then have a direct impact on domestic demand via the wealth effect or via the ability to 
borrow against collateral. Real estate price change can thus, under some circumstances, be 
                                          
8 One of the examples is the Netherlands, where a decline in real estate price growth from 20% in 2000 to zero in 
2003 led to a drop in consumption and to recession. It hardly makes sense to blame the euro.  
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viewed to some extent as new information for policymakers. As far as the EU4 countries are 
concerned, the current credit dynamics do not seem to pose risks to asset markets and financial 
sectors. For their monetary policies, “benign neglect” thus still makes sense.  
4. Conclusion 
Central banks have tremendous difficulties in identifying and taming asset price bubbles. Neither 
monetary policy instruments nor supervisory and regulatory measures can be of much help when 
a bubble occurs. It is therefore crucial for a central bank to conduct its monetary policy as well as 
its supervisory and regulatory roles in a way that does not promote the build-up of asset market 
bubbles. Monetary policy must therefore be maximally forward-looking. Central banks should 
not be thinking only in terms of the next two years, as is the standard for monetary policy models. 
Given the potentially long-term nature of asset price misalignments, analyses of financial stability 
supporting monetary policy-making must look at longer horizons while applying a risk 
management approach to financial market developments. In exceptional times, central banks of 
small open economies must be ready to use monetary policy steps as a kind of insurance against 
the adverse effects of potential asset market bubbles. The reaction to other sorts of bubbles 
should depend on the particular conditions in the given time. As far as the EU4 countries are 
concerned, the current credit dynamics do not seem to pose risks to asset markets and financial 
sectors. For their monetary policies, “benign neglect” thus still makes sense.  
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Appendix: Inflation and Nominal Exchange Rates in the EU4 
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Note: rhs: (+) appreciation, (-) depreciation. The shaded area identifies membership of the EU. 
Source: Eurostat, IMF-IFS CD-ROM and authors’ calculations. 
 
